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ARTICLES
IS THE PCAOB A "HEAVILY CONTROLLED COMPONENT" OF THE
SEC?: AN ESSENTIAL QUESTION IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTROVERSY
Donna M Nagy*
The U.S. Supreme Court recently heard oral arguments in Free Enterprise
Fundv. Public CompanyAccounting Oversight Board,' described as "the most
important separation-of-powers case regarding the President's appointment
and removal powers to reach the courts in the last 20 years."2 Established by
Congress as the cornerstone of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-
Oxley" or the "Act"),3 the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (the
"PCAOB" or the "Board") was structured as "a strong, independent board to
oversee the conduct of the auditors of public companies."4 Its principal
mission was to prevent the type of auditing failures that contributed to the
* C. Ben Dutton Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law-Bloomington. I
presented this Article at a symposium, The Past, Present, and Future of the SEC, held at the University of
Pittsburgh School of Law on October 16, 2009, and I am grateful to Professors Douglas Branson and Peter
Oh, the student editors, and my fellow symposium participants. The Article also has benefited from insights
and comments by Professors Alfred Aman, John Applegate, Hannah Buxbaum, Kent Greenfield, Leandra
Lederman, Margaret Sachs, Tuan Samahon, Faith Stevelman, and Joseph Tomain, and from presentations
made at Boston College Law School and the 2009 Meeting of the Law and Society Association. Marshall
Magaro provided excellent research assistance.
1. Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Account. Over. Bd., 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert.
granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3625 (U.S. May 18, 2009) (No. 08-861).
2. Id. at 685 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered
sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). The Act contains eleven titles; "The Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board" is Title I (15 U.S.C. §§ 7211-7219).
4. S. REP. No. 107-205, at 2 (2002).
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scandals at Enron, WorldCom, and numerous other public companies in the
period leading up to the passage of the Act.
The PCAOB's unique design as a private-sector corporation with vast
regulatory powers sparked controversy from the start. Notwithstanding
Sarbanes-Oxley's explicit provision that "[t]he Board shall not be an agency
or establishment of the United States Government,"' my first article on the
PCAOB contended that the Board is part of the federal government, at least
for purposes of the Constitution.6 In the course of the Free Enterprise Fund
litigation, the PCAOB and the Department of Justice ("DOJ") as intervenor
have conceded that the PCAOB is subject to constitutional scrutiny.7
Accordingly, the controversy now centers on whether the PCAOB's structure
complies with the Appointments Clause and the doctrine of separation of
powers. That structure has been called into question because the five members
who head the PCAOB are neither appointed nor removable by the President.
Instead, PCAOB members are appointed for fixed, five-year terms by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC" or "Commission"), an
independent regulatory agency that is itself insulated from direct presidential
control. Moreover, PCAOB members are removable only by the SEC and only
for willful or unjustifiable transgressions. On behalf of a group of corporate
and securities law scholars, I filed an amici curiae brief supporting the
Petitioners' position that the PCAOB's structure is unconstitutional.' The brief
made clear that while we applauded Congress's decision to establish a new
regulator to oversee the auditors of public companies, we were concerned that
the particular design accorded the PCAOB substantial discretion and
autonomy without imposing constitutionally sufficient accountability.9
No matter how the Supreme Court rules on the constitutional issues, its
decision in Free Enterprise Fund is bound to have far-reaching implications
for the future of securities enforcement and financial regulation in general. If
the PCAOB's structure is upheld by the Court, we can expect Congress to
create many more independent regulators answerable in only limited respects
5. 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (b) (2006).
6. See Donna M. Nagy, Playing Peekaboo With Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its
Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975 (2005).
7. See Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Account. Over. Bd., 2007 WL 891675, at *3 (D.D.C.
2007) (stating "[t]he parties agree that, at least for purposes of these motions, PCAOB should be considered
a governmental entity, and so it shall be").
8. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors, Donna M. Nagy et al., Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co.
Account. Over. Bd. (No.08-861) (filed Aug. 3, 2009), 2009 WL 2406371.
9. Id. at 1. Much of what follows builds on the arguments in that Brief, but I am speaking only for
myself in this Article.
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to the SEC or other independent regulatory agencies. Congress has already
been urged to create PCAOB-like entities to oversee credit rating agencies"
and the mutual fund industry." The possibility of additional regulators
modeled on the PCAOB is worrisome because the PCAOB's structure renders
it less accountable to the public than traditional independent regulatory
agencies (whose members are appointed by the President with advice and
consent from the Senate, and are removable for cause by the President).
Moreover, regulators designated as "private" can operate with substantially
less transparency because statutes such as the Administrative Procedures Act
(APA), the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and the Government in
Sunshine Act generally apply only to federal agencies.
Significant consequences will also flow from a Court ruling that the
PCAOB's structure is unconstitutional. Although Congress likely would act
quickly to restructure the PCAOB, either as a regulator with presidentially
appointed board members who are removable for-cause by the President or as
a unit within the SEC with members who are SEC employees, the legislative
process could open the door to additional changes.'2 A ruling that the PCAOB
is unconstitutional may also subject the Municipal Securities Rulemaking
Board (MSRB) and the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) to
new constitutional scrutiny, since both the MSRB and the SIPC share the
PCAOB's status as a congressionally created regulator in the private sector.
A broad holding by the Court could raise questions about the level of
independence asserted by even long-standing federal agencies such as the
10. See Frank Partnoy, Rethinking Regulation of Credit Rating Agencies: An Institutional Investor
Perspective, White Paper prepared for the Council of Institutional Investors, April 2009, at 8, available at
http://www.cii.orgfUserFiles/file/CRAWitePaperO4-14-09.pdf (proposing the creation of "a single
independent Credit Rating Agency Oversight Board (CRAOB), with a structure and mission similar to that
of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)").
11. See John C. Coates, Reforming the Taxation and Regulation of Mutual Funds: A Comparative
Legal and Economic Analysis, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 591,657-58 (2009) (bemoaning the lack of resources
available to the SEC's Division of Investment Management, and suggesting, among other possibilities,
moving Investment Management "outside of the SEC altogether" into a new entity modeled on the
PCAOB); Mutual Funds: Who 's Looking Out for Investors? Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H.R. Comm. on Financial Services,
108th Cong. 157-58 (2003) (statement of Professor Mercer Bullard) (recommending that Congress create
a Mutual Fund Oversight Board modeled on the PCAOB). See also Mutual Fund Investor Protection Act
of 2003, S. 1958, 108th Cong. § 201, 149 Cong. Rec. 15977, 15984 (2003) (introducing legislation from
Senators Thomas Daschle, Edward Kennedy, and John Kerry that, among other things, would have
established a "Mutual Fund Oversight Board").
12. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Changes Needed Before Fed is Given Regulatory Mission, N.Y. L.J.
5 (July 16, 2009) (noting "the number of interest groups intensively eager to add their small change to
Sarbanes-Oxley").
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Federal Reserve, an entity often described as "the most independent of all
federal agencies and the least subject to congressional oversight."' 3
In addition, no matter what constitutional verdict is ultimately rendered
for the PCAOB, the Court's decision may affect the self-regulatory
organizations (SROs) in the securities industry, such as New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA)
(formerly, the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)). Indeed,
because Congress modeled the SEC's oversight of the PCAOB on the
statutory provisions applicable to the NYSE and NASD, the Court is likely to
examine closely the relationship between those SROs and the SEC in the
course of its analysis of the PCAOB.
Securities law scholars are generally reluctant to delve into debates about
constitutional and administrative law. Yet Free Enterprise Fund raises a
threshold issue that calls out for securities law expertise. As this Article will
show, the D.C. Circuit's 2-1 decision upholding the constitutionality of the
PCAOB"4 was predicated on the majority's determination that the PCAOB
was a "heavily controlled component" of the SEC,15 with the Board's exercise
of its statutory duties "subject to check by the Commission at every significant
step."' 6 If the D.C. Circuit's depiction of the PCAOB is incorrect, as this
Article contends, then the arguments supporting the PCAOB's
constitutionality fall with it. PCAOB members acting with significant
discretion and autonomy outside of the SEC's control would be "principal
officers" who, pursuant to the Appointments Clause, must be appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of the Senate. And as "principal
officers" performing significant executive functions, PCAOB members must
be removable for cause by the President. Securities scholars thus have much
to contribute to the constitutional analysis of the PCAOB. 7
13. David Zaring, In Defense ofthe Fed's lndependence, Washington Post-Hearing Online Forum,
July 10, 2009, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/hearing/2009/07/indefense independent__fed.html.
14. Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Account. Over. Bd., 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The full
D.C. Circuit, by a 5-4 vote, denied rehearing en banc.
15. Id. at 680.
16. Id. at 673. See also id. at 675 (emphasizing the Board's role as a "specialized component of the
Commission").
17. For recent essays by distinguished constitutional and administrative law scholars, see Peter L.
Strauss, Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC
51 (2009); Harold H. Bruff, Bringing the Independent Agencies in from the Cold, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN
BANC 63 (2009); Gary Lawson, The "Principal "Reason Why the PCAOB is Unconstitutional, 62 VAND.
L. REv. EN BANC 73 (2009); Richard H. Pildes, Putting Power Back into Separation of Powers Analysis:
Why the SEC-PCAOB Structure is Constitutional, 62 VAND. L. REv. EN BANC 85 (2009); Steve G.
Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, Remove Morrison v. Olson, 62 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 103 (2009).
[Vol. 71:361
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The essential role for securities scholars in the debate over the PCAOB's
constitutionality became even clearer during the oral argument before the
Supreme Court. At the outset of the Government's argument, Solicitor
General Elena Kagan emphasized that "resolution of this case" turns on a
"simple syllogism."'" Her major premise was that the "President has
constitutionally sufficient control over the SEC" and her minor premise was
that "[t]he SEC has comprehensive control over the Accounting Board." 9 Her
conclusion was that "the President has constitutionally sufficient control over
the Accounting Board."2 I completely agree that the constitutionality of the
PCAOB turns on the validity of this syllogism. This Article, however, seeks
to show that the syllogism's minor premise is grounded in an inaccurate view
of the PCAOB-SEC relationship.
The analysis in this Article proceeds in three parts. Part I presents a
snapshot of the PCAOB and examines the D.C. Circuit's majority and
dissenting opinions. Part HI challenges the panel majority's characterization of
the PCAOB as a "heavily controlled component" of the SEC and explains why
the PCAOB must instead be regarded as an independent regulatory entity in
its own right. In so doing, Part II examines Sarbanes-Oxley's text, its
legislative history, the SRO model on which the PCAOB was patterned, and
insights derived from the constitutional doctrine of nondelegation. Building
on the view that PCAOB members exercise significant discretion and
autonomy notwithstanding the SEC's oversight and enforcement authority,
Part III then analyzes the PCAOB under the Appointments Clause and the
doctrine of separation of powers. It concludes that the PCAOB's structure
violates the Constitution in both respects. Part I also explains why neither
the regulated nor protected public is well served by a congressionally created
"private" regulator such as the PCAOB with double-decker independence.
18. See Transcript of Oral Argument, Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (No. 08-861), at *30, 2009 WL 45715555.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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PART ONE: A SNAPSHOT OF THE PCAOB AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONTROVERSY
A. The PCAOB's "Strange" Design
In establishing the PCAOB "to oversee the audit of public companies,"'"
Congress recognized that it was creating a "strange kind of entity."22 As
Senator Phil Gramm explained: "We want it to be private, but we want it to
have governmental powers. We have tried to structure it in ways to try to
accommodate this."23
There is no dispute that Sarbanes-Oxley, enacted in the wake of the
massive accounting and corporate governance scandals at Enron, WorldCom,
and other public companies, vested the PCAOB with broad governmental
powers and responsibilities. These powers and responsibilities encompass
substantial enforcement, rulemaking, and adjudicative functions,24 and include
the authority to register accounting firms that audit public companies;25 enact
rules setting standards for auditing, quality control, ethics, and
independence;" inspect on a yearly basis the nation's largest accounting firms
and inspect other firms at least once every three years;27 investigate
accounting firms and their associated persons for possible violations of
PCAOB rules or the federal securities laws;28 and impose discipline for
established violations through a range of sanctions including censures,
temporary suspensions, permanent bars, and substantial monetary fines.29
Willful violations of PCAOB rules may be prosecuted by the DOJ as federal
crimes.30 In addition, the Act authorizes the PCAOB to set its own budget, and
21. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (2006).
22. 148 CONG. REc. 12,122 (2002) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
23. Id.
24. See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, No. GAO-03-339, Securities and Exchange Commission:
Actions Needed to Improve Public Company Accounting Oversight Board Selection Process 1 (2002)
(noting that "[t]he PCAOB was given broad powers to inspect the accounting firms performing [public
company] audits, set rules and standards for such audits, and impose meaningful sanctions if warranted").
25. 15 U.S.C. § 7212 (2006).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 7213 (2006).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 7214 (2006).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 7214.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 7214. Sarbanes-Oxley further authorizes the PCAOB to"perform such other duties
or functions as the Board (or the Commission, by rule or order) determines are necessary or appropriate...
to carry out this Act, in order to protect investors, or to further the public interest." 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (c)(5)
(2006).
30. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 32(a) (2006), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2006)
(applicable through Section 3(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7202(b) (2006)).
[Vol. 71:361
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to fund that budget through the imposition of an "accounting support fee"
levied on public companies.3'
The statutory text also evidences Congress's clear intention to vest the
PCAOB's broad regulatory powers in a private, nonprofit corporation. In a
subsection captioned "status," Congress provided that:
The Board shall not be an agency or establishment of the United States Government
and, except as otherwise provided in this Act, shall be subject to, and have all the
powers conferred upon a nonprofit corporation by, the District of Columbia
Nonprofit Corporation Act. No member or person employed by, or agent for, the
Board shall be deemed to be an officer or employee of or agent for the Federal
Government by reason of such service.32
The PCAOB is headed by five members appointed by the SEC for fixed five-
year terms "after consultation with the Chairman of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System and the Secretary of the Treasury," with
vacancies filled "in the same manner."33 PCAOB members can be removed
from office only by the SEC and only for "good cause shown,"34 with "good
cause" defined restrictively.35 Congress further provided that the SEC "shall
have oversight and enforcement over the Board, as provided in this Act."'36
More than a decade ago, in Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp.,"
the Supreme Court articulated a three-part test for determining whether a
corporation would be deemed a part of the federal government for purposes
of constitutional law, notwithstanding statutory text to the contrary. The
Lebron case involved a First Amendment challenge to actions by Amtrak,
which, like the PCAOB, was established by an Act of Congress providing that
the corporation "will not be an agency or establishment of the United States
Government."3 Justice Scalia, writing for himself and seven other Justices,
held explicitly that "it is not for Congress to make the final determination of
[a corporation's] status as a Government entity for purposes of determining
the constitutional rights of citizens affected by its actions."39 The Court then
concluded that Amtrak must adhere to the First Amendment because where
31. 15 U.S.C. § 7219(b)-(d) (2006). See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
32. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(b).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(4).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(6).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 7217(d)(3) (2006). See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
36. 15 U.S.C. § 7217(a). See infra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
37. Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
38. Id. at 391 (quoting 45 U.S.C. § 541 (2006)).
39. Id. at 392.
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(1) "the Government creates a corporation by special law," (2) "for the
furtherance of governmental objectives," and (3) "retains for itself permanent
authority to appoint a majority of the directors of that corporation," that entity
"is part of the Government for purposes of [the Constitution]." 40
Although PCAOB officials initially intimated that its status as a private
corporation allowed it to operate free from the constraints of the
Constitution,4' the PCAOB's congressional creation as a regulatory entity with
an SEC-appointed board ultimately left the PCAOB and DOJ with no choice
but to concede that, under the holding in Lebron, the PCAOB is "part of the
Government" and its members are federal officers for purposes of
constitutional law.42
Congress's design of the PCAOB as a "strange kind of entity" thus
presents the Supreme Court with a statutory conundrum: The Court must
determine whether PCAOB members are "principal officers" or "inferior
officers" in the face of a congressional statute providing that PCAOB
members are not federal officers. This conundrum requires the Court itself to
situate the PCAOB within an organizational chart of the federal government.
Only then can the Justices determine whether the Appointments Clause
permits PCAOB members to be appointed by the SEC, and whether the
statutory limitations on the appointment and removal of PCAOB members are
consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers.
B. The Decision by the D.C. Circuit
When the D.C. Circuit attempted to place the PCAOB within an
organizational chart of the federal government, the members of its three-judge
panel constructed diametrically different versions. 3 Judge Judith Rogers, in
a majority opinion joined by Judge Janice Brown, depicted the PCAOB as a
"specialized" and "heavily controlled component" of the SEC,44 with the
Board's exercise of its statutory duties "subject to check by the Commission
40. Id. at 400.
41. See Mary M. Sjoquist & Marilyn H. Weimer, The PCAOB Takes on Enforcement, 7 WALL ST.
LAw. 1, Mar. 2004, at 1, 3-7, available at http'www.realcoporatelawyer.com/ws/ws10304.html (stating
that the PCAOB intended to recognize good-faith assertions of the privilege against self-incrimination, but
observing that as "a non-governmental entity, the Board has a strong argument that the Fifth Amendment
does not apply to its processes, and thus could require registered public accounting firms or their associated
persons to testify or produce documents").
42. See supra note 40.
43. Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Account. Over. Bd., 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
44. Id. at 675, 680.
[Vol. 71:361
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at every significant step."'45 In sharp contrast, Judge Brett Kavanaugh's dissent
regarded the PCAOB as "an independent agency appointed by and removable
for cause by another independent agency.'46
Several factors contributed to the majority's view that the SEC's authority
over the PCAOB was "extraordinary." '47 The majority emphasized that "the
Commission approves all Board rules, and may abrogate, delete, or add to
them."'48 Moreover, "[a]ll Board sanctions are subject to plenary review by the
Commission, and the Commission 'may enhance, modify, cancel, reduce, or
require the remission of a sanction imposed by the Board."'49 Thus, "[n]o
Board rule is promulgated and no Board sanction is imposed without the
Commission's stamp of approval."5 The majority further emphasized that the
SEC must approve the PCAOB's annual budget as well as the formula for the
"accounting support fee" that Congress authorized the PCAOB to levy on
public companies to fund its budget.5 The majority also called attention to the
SEC's broad enforcement authority over the PCAOB, and highlighted the
specific provisions in the Act that, in the majority's words, authorize the SEC
"to limit and remove Board authority altogether."52 These broad enforcement
provisions, according to the majority, essentially grant the SEC "at-will
removal power over Board functions if not Board members[.]"53 In addition,
the majority highlighted Sarbanes-Oxley's provision empowering the SEC to
"promulgate such rules and regulations, as may be necessary or appropriate
in the public interest, or for the protection of investors, in furtherance of this
Act. 54
The majority's view of the PCAOB as a "heavily controlled component"
of the SEC was essential to its ultimate conclusion that the PCAOB's structure
violates neither the Appointments Clause nor the doctrine of separation of
powers. With respect to the Appointments Clause, the majority held that "in
view of the Commission's comprehensive control of the Board, Board
members are subject to direction and supervision of the Commission and thus
45. Id. at 673.
46. Id. at 698 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 669.
48. Id. at 672 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 7217(b)(5) (2006)).
49. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 7217(c)(3)).
50. Id. at 680.
51. Id. at 669 (citing 15 U.S. C. § 7219(c), (d) (2006)).
52. Id. at 680.
53. Id. at 683.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 7202(a) (2006) (as cited in Free Enterprise Fund, 537 F.3d at 673).
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are inferior officers not required to be appointed by the President."5 With
respect to the separation of powers claim, the majority held that the statutory
limitations on the SEC's power to remove PCAOB members coupled with the
for-cause limitations on the President's power to remove the SEC's
Commissioners "do not strip the President of sufficient power to influence the
Board and thus do not contravene separation of powers, as that principle
embraces independent agencies like the Commission and their exercise of
broad authority over their subordinates."56
Judge Kavanaugh's view that the PCAOB constitutes an "independent
agency," notwithstanding the SEC's oversight and enforcement authority over
the Board, was likewise essential to his conclusion that the PCAOB's
structure violates both the Appointments Clause and principles of separation
of power. In his view, PCAOB members are not "inferior officers" within the
meaning of the Appointments Clause because they "are not 'directed and
supervised' by the SEC."5 7 Here, Judge Kavanaugh emphasized that the SEC
lacks at-will removal authority over Board members, "the SEC does not have
statutory authority to remove them for failure to follow substantive SEC
direction or supervision; and the SEC does not have statutory authority to
prevent and affirmatively command, and to manage the ongoing conduct of,
Board inspections, Board investigations, and Board enforcement actions.""
Thus, as Judge Kavanaugh saw it, the PCAOB's five members are "principal
officers" who must be appointed by the President subject to advice and
consent from the Senate. He also emphasized that the PCAOB's five members
are removable for cause only by the SEC, which is itself an independent
agency whose members are removable only for cause by the President, and
that the "President's power to remove is critical to the President's power to
control the Executive Branch and perform his Article II responsibilities."59
Accordingly, Judge Kavanaugh concluded that the PCAOB's structure
violates separation of powers because the President's "two levels of for-cause
removal away from Board members.., effectively eliminates any Presidential
power to control the PCAOB, notwithstanding that the Board performs
55. Free Enterprise Fund, 5 3 7 F.3d at 669 (referencing the "direction and supervision" test that the
Supreme Court articulated in Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997)).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 687 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (quoting Edmond, 520 U.S. at 663).
58. Id. at 687 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 686 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 71:361
HeinOnline -- 71 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 370 2009-2010
2010] IS THE PCAOB A "HEAVILY CONTROLLED COMPONENT"? 371
numerous regulatory and law-enforcement functions at the core of executive
power."6
PART Two: THE PCAOB's SUBSTANTIVE INDEPENDENCE FROM THE SEC
As the above snapshot reveals, the three members of the D.C. Circuit
panel differed not so much in their view of the Constitution as in their view
of the structural relationship between the SEC and the PCAOB. The majority
went so far as to observe that if "the Board is itself an independent agency...
the dissent's conclusion that the Board's structure is unconstitutional
conveniently follows."'
The analysis in this Part explains why the panel majority's depiction of
the PCAOB as a "heavily controlled component" of the SEC is inaccurate.
Section A examines Sarbanes-Oxley's establishment of the PCAOB as a
private corporation and takes issue with the view that the PCAOB is a
"component" of the SEC. Section B then highlights the statutory text and
legislative history evidencing Congress's intent to establish the PCAOB as a
strong, independent board headed by five members who would act with
substantial discretion and autonomy. Section C examines the SRO model on
which the PCAOB was patterned. This model, and the SEC's own statements
regarding SRO discretion and autonomy, bolsters the conclusion that Congress
designed the PCAOB to be substantively independent from the SEC. The
fourth and final section examines the constitutional doctrine of nondelegation
and explains why this doctrine provides valuable insight into congressional
decisions regarding the PCAOB's design. This examination, in turn, informs
the analysis of the Appointments Clause and separation of powers issues in
the final Part of this Article.
A. The PCAOB's Status as a Corporation in the Private Sector
Congress's decision to create the PCAOB as a nonprofit corporation in
the private sector belies the characterization of the PCAOB as a "component"
of the SEC, or as a "regulatory subunit" within the SEC, as amici supporting
the PCAOB have suggested.62 As the Supreme Court explained in Lebron,
60. Id.
61. Free Enterprise Fund, 537 F.3d at 680 n.9.
62. See Brief of Amici Curiae Former Chairmen of the Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Free Enterprise
Fund v. Public Co. Account. Over. Bd., 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008), at 10. See also id. at 2 (arguing that
"[b]ecause Congress has the power to create independent agencies, it has the lesser power of creating
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although Congress's decision to situate an entity in the private sector is not
determinative of its status for constitutional purposes, Congress's choice of
the private sector "is assuredly dispositive of" that entity's status "for
purposes of matters that are within Congress's control-for example, whether
it is subject to statutes that impose obligations or confer powers upon
Government entities, such as the Administrative Procedure Act, the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, and the laws governing Government
procurement."63 Congress's decision to situate the PCAOB in the private
sector should also be dispositive as to whether the PCAOB is a "component"
or a "regulatory subunit" of the SEC.
By establishing the PCAOB as a private corporation, Congress ensured
that the PCAOB would stand separate and apart from the SEC. It is that
separateness that exempts the PCAOB from statutes applicable to federal
"agencies," including those statutes cited by the Court in Lebron. The
PCAOB's separateness from the SEC also facilitates the substantial salaries
that are paid to PCAOB members and employees. In 2008, the Chairman of
the PCAOB received a salary of $654,406, and the PCAOB's four other
members received $531,995.64 Those salaries are almost four times the amount
received by the SEC's Chairman and Commissioners, but are comparable to
those commanded in the private sector. Congress's concern about salary
competiveness is clear from the Act's text, which authorizes the PCAOB to
fix employee salaries "at a level comparable to private sector self-regulatory,
accounting, supervisory, or other staff or management positions. '65 Concern
about competitive compensation was no doubt an important factor in
Congress's decision to situate the PCAOB in the private sector. 6
subunits such as the PCAOB within these agencies ... ").
63. Lebron, 513 U.S. at 392 (statutory citations omitted).
64. Kenneth Starr & Viet Dinh, Op-Ed, The PCAOB: An Obstacle to President Obama 's Success,
WALL ST. J., May 13, 2009.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(f)(4)(2006).
66. When the PCAOB's then-Chairman was asked to comment on the reasons behind Congress's
choice to organize the PCAOB as a nonprofit corporation, he offered the following explanation:
We were created as a not-for profit corporation largely so the PCAOB could pay better than the
government. . . . [Members of Congress] realized that they were piling an immense
responsibility on a startup, and so one of the things they figured out is you're going to have to
pay people better than the government can pay.
William J. McDonough, The Fourth Annual A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, Securities &
Financial Law, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 583,599 (2004). PCAOB board member Charles Niemeier
shared a similar opinion:
Congress had a stroke of genius when it chose to organize the board as an independent not-for-
profit organization rather than as a unit of the government. The board will be able to offer a
compensation structure that will attract highly qualified individuals and offer them a career path
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Attempts to salvage the PCAOB's constitutionality by reconstructing it
as a "component" or a "regulatory subunit" of the SEC are particularly
inappropriate because Congress specifically considered that alternative and
rejected it in favor of the structure ultimately selected for the PCAOB. In
creating the PCAOB as an independent regulator in the private sector,
Congress acted contrary to the advice provided by its own agent, the
Comptroller General of the United States.
In the Senate hearings that preceded the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley,
then-Comptroller General David Walker testified that there were "several
alternative structures" from which Congress could choose in establishing a
new regulator for the accounting industry, including the creation of: "(1) a
new unit within the SEC; (2) an independent government entity within the
SEC; (3) an independent government agency outside the SEC; or (4) a
nongovernmental private-sector body overseen by the SEC."67 Although he
recognized that all four alternatives had strengths and weaknesses, the
Comptroller General believed that alternatives one and four had lesser
likelihoods of success. He specifically noted that "under alternatives one and
four, the new body would have less direct accountability to the Congress and
the public than a body with board members who are PASs [President
appointed confirmed by the Senate] ."68
The legislative history further reveals that the House of Representatives
had initially favored an alternative altogether different from the four suggested
by the Comptroller General. Under the proposed "Corporate and Auditing
Accountability, Responsibility, and Transparency Act" (CAARTA), a bill
sponsored by Representative Michael Oxley, Congress would have established
explicit criteria for "public regulatory organizations," but Congress itself
would not have created any such entity. 9 Rather, the bill required the SEC to
promulgate rules reflecting and supplementing the congressional criteria, and
authorized the SEC to "recognize" entities that applied to the SEC pursuant
to its rules. As such, this section of the CAARTA bore a close resemblance
that simply is not possible for people in the government.
Robert H. Colson, Maintaining Public Credibility: An Interview with Charles D. Niemeier, CPA J., Apr. 1,
2003, at 18, 19-20 (emphasis added).
67. See Oversight Hearings on Accounting Reform andlnvestorProtection Issues Raised by Enron
and OtherPublic Companies Before the S. Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Comm., 107th Cong. 661
(2002) (Letter from David Walker, U.S. Comptroller Gen., to Sen. Paul Sarbanes) [hereinafter Oversight
Hearings].
68. Id.
69. H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. § 2(b) (2002).
70. Id. § 2(a).
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to provisions in the Maloney Act of 1938,"1 which authorized the SEC to
"recognize" national securities associations, such as the NASD. Critics of the
CAARTA contended that its framework left too much discretion with the SEC
and the accounting industry itself, "effectively allowing these issues to remain
open to debate even after Congress has acted."72 Critics also pointed to the
accounting industry's largely unsuccessful history of self-regulation.73
Although CAARTA passed the House by a vote of 334 to 90,74 its "public
regulatory organization" alternative was subsequently abandoned in favor of
an accounting oversight board that was congressionally created.
Congress also contemplated alternatives that would have made the SEC
directly responsible for the oversight of public accounting finms. A number of
witnesses, including former SEC Chairman Richard Breeden, advised against
the creation of a new accounting regulator, and instead urged Congress to
increase the SEC's funding so that the SEC could serve as the "primary
enforcer of the law."75 Responsive to these and other suggestions for enhanced
SEC responsibility, H.R. 5184 would have required the SEC to "establish the
Office of Audit Review within the Division of Corporate Finance of the
Commission to oversee the audits of certain public companies."" This new
71. Pub. L. No. 75-719, 52 Star. 1070 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3).
72. See H.R. REP.No. 107-414, at 47-48 (2002) (presentingminority views). In the minority's view,
"[d]elegating decisions on its duties and powers to the SEC provide[s] an opportunity for the new regulator
to be weakened." Id.
73. See id. at 48 (referencing the "tangled jumble of existing industry organizations"). See also
Nagy, supra note 6, at 996-98 (discussing the congressional hearings that led up to the passage of
Sarbanes-Oxley, and noting that most witnesses "shared the view that the accounting profession's system
of self-regulation was in need of a serious overhaul" and that any newly-created entity "should not be
dependent for funding on the accounting profession").
74. 148 CONG. REc. 5548 (2002).
75. See Oversight Hearings, supra note 67, at 37 (testimony of Richard C. Breeden, former
Chairman of the SEC) ("We don't need to go and invent another [body]. We need to invigorate the SEC
and make sure it has the tools to do the job. Let's not reinvent the wheel. Downstream from the SEC,
private sectors groups can be helpful .... But let's [not] lose sight. The primary enforcer of the law needs
to be the Commission."). See also id. at 208 (testimony of Walter P. Schuetze, Chief Accountant, SEC,
1992-95) ("[G ive the SEC pay parity, increase their budgets, so they can do more and better jobs. But
don't create another body that is going to compete with us"); id. at 874 (prepared statement of Robert E.
Litan, Director, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution Bear, Steams & Co., Inc.) ("I urge
[Congress] at least to consider whether the SEC itself should be performing the oversight of auditors
directly....").
76. See The Corporate Auditing Integrity Act, H.R. 5184 § 2, 107th Cong. (2002) (introduced by
Representative Danny Davis D-IL).
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unit within the SEC would have been self-funded through fees assessed on
public companies." H.R. 5184, however, received little legislative support.7
Sarbanes-Oxley's text leaves no doubt that Congress ultimately chose the
fourth alternative outlined in the Comptroller General's Senate
testimony-the creation of"a nongovernmental private-sector entity overseen
by the SEC." Thus, in depicting the PCAOB as a mere "component" of the
SEC to salvage its constitutionality, the D.C. Circuit essentially turned back
the clock and selected for Congress the Comptroller General's first alternative
that Congress had rejected--"a unit within the SEC." Because the choice of
a constitutional structure for the PCAOB is one that belongs to Congress, the
Supreme Court should not affirm that revisionism.
B. The PCAOB's Substantial Discretion and Autonomy
The D.C. Circuit erred not only in its finding that the PCAOB was a
"component" of the SEC; it was also incorrect in its assessment that Sarbanes-
Oxley's provision for SEC oversight and enforcement constitutes
"extraordinary" authority,79 with the PCAOB's powers subject to "a vast
degree of Commission control at every significant step."' Both the Act's text
and legislative history confirm Congress's deliberate intention to structure the
PCAOB as an entity that would operate with a substantial degree of discretion
and autonomy, free from SEC control in a number of important respects.
1. The Statutory Text
Several aspects of the statutory text evidence the PCAOB's substantive
independence from the SEC. First and foremost are the Act's provisions for
appointment and removal of the PCAOB's five members. PCAOB members
are appointed by the SEC for staggered five-year terms,"' and are removable
77. Id. at § 4.
78. The House of Representatives also considered and rejected an alternative bill, H.R. 3795, that
would have established within the SEC a "Federal Bureau of Audits" (the FBA). See Investor, Shareholder,
and Employee Protection Act, H.R. 3795, 107th Cong. § 3 (a) (2002) (introduced by Representative Dennis
Kucinich (D., OH)). The FBA would have consisted of a Director, Deputy Director, and Inspector General
and would have had the authority to "hold hearings, sign and issue subpoenas, administer oaths, examine
witnesses, and receive evidence at any place in the United States it may designate." H.R. 3795 § 3(g).
79. Free Enterprise Fund, 537 F.3d at 669.
80. Id. at 683.
81. 15U.S.C. §7211(eX4) (2006).
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by the SEC only for "good cause shown." 2 These fixed terms of service and
express statutory limitations on removal ensure that PCAOB members are not,
in the words of the D.C. Circuit, "entirely subordinate to the Commission."83
Indeed, fixed statutory terms of service, with explicit or implicit restrictions
on an official's removal, constitute the traditional hallmarks of an
"independent" regulatory agency.
8 4
PCAOB members are insulated from removal-or threats of removal-to
an extent even greater than the political insulation accorded to SEC
Commissioners. SEC Commissioners, like the heads of many other
independent agencies, serve for fixed five-year terms. And SEC
Commissioners, like other agency heads, may be removed from office only
"for cause" by the President. But "cause," for purposes of Presidential
removal, is typically viewed as "inefficiency, neglect of duty or malfeasance
in office." 5 A contemplated removal of a PCAOB member by the SEC, in
contrast, triggers specific procedural protections and requires a higher
showing of culpability. The Act provides that PCAOB members may be
removed only if:
The Commission finds, on the record, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, that
such member:
(A) has willfully violated any provision of this Act, the rules of the Board, or the
securities laws;
(B) has willfully abused the authority of that member,
or (C) without reasonable justification or excuse, has failed to enforce compliance
with any such provision or rule, or any professional standard by an registered public
accounting firm or any associated person thereof."
The statutory requirement for an on-the-record finding of a Board member's
"willful" violation or abuse of authority, and the specific allowance for
enforcement failures based on "reasonable" justifications or excuses,
constitute severe limitations on the SEC's ability to influence the five
82. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(eX6).
83. Free Enterprise Fund, 537 F.3d at 680 n.9.
84. See id. at 701 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that the term "'independent agency'...
traditionally has been applied by the Supreme Court, the Congress, and the Executive Branch to agencies
like the PCAOB whose heads are not removable at will").
85. See MFS Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 380 F.3d 611, 619 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting SEC v. Blinder
Robinson & Co., 855 F.2d 677,681 (10th Cir. 1988) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989)).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 7217(d)(3) (2006).
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members of the SEC and ensure that the SEC cannot exert a "vast degree of
... control at every significant step."
87
Sarbanes-Oxley's provision for fixed terms and restricted removal allow
PCAOB members to remain free to establish and pursue their own policy
goals and priorities, particularly with respect to PCAOB investigations,
enforcement actions, and rulemaking. The SEC might, for example, conclude
that the PCAOB is devoting too many-or too few-of its investigatory
resources to the large accounting finns; or that the PCAOB is bringing too
many-or too few-enforcement actions in the area of auditor independence.
Likewise, the SEC could conclude that the PCAOB's rulemaking initiatives
should be focusing less-or more-on the area of internal controls. The SEC,
however, cannot act on its displeasure by threatening to replace one or more
of the PCAOB's five members with new members whose policy priorities
would be more in line with the SEC's. Once a PCAOB member is appointed,
the Act effectively provides that he or she has five years to shape and pursue
policy, provided that the member does not engage in willful or unjustifiable
transgressions. Other than insulation from control by the SEC (and indirectly
from the President and Congress), what other purpose is served by the Act's
provision for fixed terms and highly circumscribed removal?
The PCAOB's substantial discretion and autonomy is further evidenced
by the limited statutory role assigned to the SEC with respect to Board
inspections, investigations, and enforcement determinations. To be sure,
Sarbanes-Oxley provides for SEC oversight in connection with the PCAOB's
final rules and disciplinary sanctions,88 and authorizes the SEC to inspect and
examine the PCAOB's records. 9 The Act also obligates the PCAOB to notify
the SEC about any pending investigations involving potential violations of the
federal securities laws, so that the PCAOB and the SEC's Division of
Enforcement may coordinate their work.9" Yet the Act does not require SEC
notification when an investigation relates to possible violations of the
PCAOB's own rules or professional standards. Nor does the Act provide a
87. Free Enterprise Fund, 537 F.3d at 683.
88. 15 U.S.C. § 7217(b) (2006) (providing for SEC oversight in connection with "Rules of the
Board"); § 7217(c) (providing for SEC "review of disciplinary action taken by the Board"). See also supra
text accompanying notes 48-52 (D.C. Circuit's discussion of the statutory text pertaining to SEC
oversight).
89. 15 U.S.C. § 7217(a) (incorporating Sections 17(a)(1) and (b)(1) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78q(a)(1) and (b)(1) (2006), relating to SRO records, and specifying that these provisions "shall apply
to the Board as fully as if the Board were a 'registered securities association').
90. 15 U.S.C. § 7215(b)(4)(A) (2006).
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role for the SEC in all of the interim steps leading up to SEC review of the
PCAOB's final disciplinary sanctions.
Sarbanes-Oxley accords the PCAOB a vast array of investigative,
prosecutorial, and adjudicative powers, and the Board's exercise of these
powers often results in decisions that are not "subject to check by the
Commission at every significant step."'" With respect to PCAOB
investigations, their scope and duration (including which accounting firms and
officials are investigated, and for what) rests entirely with the Board.
Moreover, the Act provides that as a condition of registration, accounting
firms and associated persons must consent to cooperate with the PCAOB,
including any requests for the production of documents or testimony.92 The
Act's requirement of mandatory cooperation by registered firms and officials,
enforceable through Board-imposed sanctions,93 facilitates the PCAOB's
ability to uncover evidence of possible violations of professional standards,
PCAOB rules, and the federal securities laws (including failures to supervise
the conduct of others), and ensures that the PCAOB can obtain evidence
without having to apply to the SEC for a subpoena.94
Based on the investigatory record presented by the PCAOB staff (a record
that may take a year or more to compile), the Board acting in its prosecutorial
capacity then decides whether enforcement action against a firm or its officials
is warranted.95 That is, the Board decides who does-or does not-have to
defend against specific charges, and the Board decides what those charges
shall be. If the Board, acting in its prosecutorial capacity, determines that the
investigatory record does not warrant enforcement action, the SEC has no
statutory review role at all.
The Board's adjudicative function commences once disciplinary charges
are filed against a firm or associated person. In its adjudicative capacity, the
Board decides whether the facts (agreed to in a settlement or placed in
91. Free Enterprise Fund, 537 F.3d at 673.
92. 15 U.S.C. § 7212(b)(3) (2006).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 7215(b)(3) (authorizing PCAOB-imposed sanctions (including suspension, bars,
and revocation of registration) in the event a firm or associated person "refuses to testify, produce
documents or otherwise cooperate with a PCAOB investigation").
94. To further enhance the PCAOB's powers as a regulator, the Act provides that the PCAOB may
seek issuance by the SEC of a subpoena for documents or testimony, where third parties outside the
auditing industry are unable or unwilling to cooperate voluntarily. 15 U.S.C. § 7215(b)(2)(C).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 7215(c)(1)(A)-(B) (specifying that in connection with any disciplinary proceeding,
the Board shall "bring specific charges with respect to the firm or associated person," provide notice of, and
"an opportunity to defend against, such charges").
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evidence at a hearing) establish the alleged violations,96 and the Board
determines the appropriate sanction if violations are found.97 Evidentiary
hearings are generally conducted in the first instance by a hearing officer,
though the Board retains de novo power of review. If the PCAOB imposes a
disciplinary sanction, the Board must report that sanction to the SEC,
applicable state or foreign licensing boards, and the public (once any stay on
the imposition of such sanction has been lifted).98 Sanctions available include
censures, temporary suspensions or permanent revocations of registration,
temporary suspensions or permanent bars from a person's further association
with a registered accounting firm, and civil monetary penalties up to $750,000
for natural persons and $15,000,000 for any other person (for each
violation).9" The Act provides that disciplinary sanctions are automatically
stayed upon application to the SEC for review, or the institution by the SEC
of review.' 00
Accordingly, the SEC's review role in connection with PCAOB
disciplinary proceedings is an adjudicatory one. Congress accorded the SEC
de novo review power over Board discipline, and provided that the SEC "may
enhance, modify, cancel, reduce or require the remission of a sanction
imposed by the Board."'0 ' The SEC's final order affirming or modifying a
PCAOB decision is itself subject to review by a federal circuit court.' But
the SEC and federal courts provide a check on the PCAOB only if the Board
orders a disciplinary sanction. If the Board determines that the alleged charges
are not supported by the evidence presented at a hearing, that decision is not
subject to review by the SEC.
The D.C. Circuit did not dispute Sarbanes-Oxley's failure to assign the
SEC any specific role in PCAOB inspections, investigations, and enforcement
determinations (beyond the SEC' s general rulemaking power "in furtherance"
of the Act °3 and its statutory responsibility to review and approve all PCAOB
rules, including rules governing the conduct investigations and disciplinary
96. 15 U.S.C. § 7215(c)(3).
97. 15 U.S.C. § 7215(c)(4).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 7215(d)(1).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 7215(c)(4).
100. 15 U.S.C. § 7215(e).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 7217(c)(2)-(3) (2006).
102. 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) (2006) (providing that a "person aggrieved by a final order of the
Commission entered pursuant to this title may obtain review of the order in the United States Court of
Appeals for the circuit in which he resides or has his principal place of business, or for the District of
Columbia").
103. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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proceedings).° 4 But the court nonetheless regarded the PCAOB's autonomy
in these areas as trumped by the statute's "sweeping" provisions for SEC
limitations and restrictions on Board authority. °5 Specifically, the Act
provides that: "The Commission by rule, consistent with the public interest,
.. may relieve the Board of any responsibility to enforce compliance with
any provision of this Act, the federal securities laws, the rules of the Board,
or professional standards."'01 6 In addition, the Act provides that:
The Commission may, by order, as it determines necessary or appropriate in the
public interest... censure or impose limitations upon the activities, functions, and
operations of the Board if the Commission finds, on the record, after notice and
opportunity for a hearing, that the Board-
(A) has violated or is unable to comply with any provision of this Act, the rules
of the Board, or the securities laws; or
(B) without reasonable justification or excuse, has failed to enforce compliance
with any such provision or rule, or any professional standard by a registered
public accounting firm or an associated person thereof."7
Thus, in the view of the D.C. Circuit, Congress essentially granted the SEC
"at-will removal power over Board functions if not Board members[.]"' 10 8
But unlike Sarbanes-Oxley's oversight provisions, which obligate the
SEC to review the PCAOB's final rules and disciplinary actions, the SEC's
enforcement authority over the PCAOB, including its authority to displace or
limit Board functions, is merely an SEC power to sanction the PCAOB for
transgressions. In fact, the very caption of that subsection of the Act terms this
authority a "sanction."'0 9 The majority's supposition that the SEC may limit
or remove "Board authority altogether" is therefore subject to an essential
statutory prerequisite: The SEC must issue an order after an on-the-record
finding that the PCAOB engaged in sanctionable misconduct. Moreover, while
the SEC may promulgate a rule "reliev[ing]" the Board of any of its
enforcement responsibilities, the APA requires the SEC to provide a reasoned
explanation of its action after notice and the opportunity for public
104. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
105. Free Enterprise Fund, 537 F.3d at 680.
106. 15 U.S.C. § 7217(d)(1).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 7217(d)(2)(B).
108. Free Enterprise Fund, 537 F.3d at 683.
109. 15 U.S.C. § 7217(d) (captioned "Censure of the Board; Other Sanctions").
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comment," l and the rule itself would be subject to review by a federal
court. "'
There are also many provisions in the Act that would be superfluous if the
PCAOB were, as the D.C. Circuit found, subject to the SEC's "extraordinary"
direction and supervision. For example, the PCAOB is authorized to refer an
investigation to the SEC," 2 and is permitted to share with the SEC the
otherwise confidential documents and materials received by the Board in the
course of its inspections and investigations." 3 These provisions authorizing
referrals and permitting disclosure of investigative materials would have been
unnecessary had Congress truly intended the members of the PCAOB to
operate as "subordinates" of the SEC's Commissioners.
Likewise, if Congress had intended the members of the PCAOB to
function as the subordinates of the SEC, it almost certainly would have
assigned the SEC additional responsibilities to facilitate the SEC's purported
direction and supervision of Board members and employees. Instead, Congress
concentrated the SEC's oversight in three principal areas: rulemaking,
disciplinary proceedings, and funding. With respect to this latter
responsibility, the SEC must approve the PCAOB's annual budget," 4 and
must approve the formula for calculating the "accounting support fee" that
Congress authorized the PCAOB to impose on all public companies to fund
Board operations.'
The statutory design thus ensures that no PCAOB rule can become law,
no PCAOB sanction can be imposed on a firm or accountant, and no PCAOB-
imposed tax can be levied on a public company, over the SEC's specific
objection. As we shall see, insofar as the PCAOB is a private-sector
corporation, government oversight in connection with its rulemaking,
disciplinary proceedings, and taxing authority is essential. 6 Sarbanes-Oxley's
provisions for SEC oversight of the PCAOB, with very few exceptions, reflect
110. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29 (1983).
111. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) ("A person ... adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action
within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.").
112. 15 U.S.C. § 7215(bX4)(B) (2006).
113. 15 U.S.C. § 7215(bX5)(B).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 7219(b) (2006).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 7219(d) ("[T]he Board shall establish, with the approval of the Commission, a
reasonable annual accounting support fee (or a formula for the computation thereof), as may be necessary
or appropriate to establish and maintain the Board.").
116. See infra Part Il.D (discussing the constitutional doctrine of nondelegation).
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a constitutional rock-bottom minimum for a valid congressional delegation of
governmental power to a "private" corporation." 7
2. Legislative History
The legislative history of Sarbanes-Oxley reinforces the text's design of
a board that is substantively independent, not only from the accounting
industry that it regulates, but also from the SEC and elected officials to whom
the SEC is answerable. The Senate Report explains that the Act "creates a
strong, independent board to oversee the conduct of the auditors of public
companies"" 8 and emphasizes the Board's "plenary" rulemaking,1 9 and its
"broad authority to investigate" possible violations of PCAOB rules, the Act,
or the federal securities laws.' The congressional record is also replete with
references to the PCAOB as a "strong, independent.., board with significant
authority,"'' and with respect to PCAOB rulemaking, states specifically that
"[t]he board would possess plenary authority to establish or adopt auditing,
quality control, ethics, and independence standards for the auditing of public
companies."' 22 The record further reflects at least one Senator's view of the
Board as an entity with "massive power, unchecked power, by design." '123
Senator Phil Gramm's reference to the PCAOB's "massive power,
unchecked power" merits more than a mere snippet. Less than three weeks
before the passage of the Act, Senator Gramm shared with his colleagues the
view that:
117. The D.C. Circuit twice noted that the PCAOB's power to "sue and be sued, complain and
defend" is subject to the SEC's approval. Free Enterprise Fund, 537 F.3d at 670, 681 (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 7211(f)(1) (2006)). Congress may have included this provision to effectively preclude the PCAOB, as a
corporate entity in its own right, from instituting litigation against the SEC. The possibility of a regulator
subject to SEC oversight initiating litigation against its "overseer" was not unprecedented. See Nat'l Ass'n
of Sec. Dealers v. SEC, 431 F.3d 803 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (dismissing the NASD's petition for review of an
SEC order and concluding that the NASD is not a "person aggrieved" under Exchange Act § 25(a) when
the SEC exercises its statutory power of de novo review to reverse an NASD disciplinary proceeding).
118. S. REP. No. 107-205, at 2 (2002).
119. Id. at 8.
120. Id. at 10.
121. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REc. 12,955 (2002) (statement of Sen. Dodd); id. at 21,116 (statement of
Sen. Sarbanes) (stating that the PCAOB was established by "statute in order to provide an extra guarantee
of its independence and its plenary authority to deal with this important situation"). See also S. REP. No.
107-205, at 6 (2002) ("The successful operation of the Board depends upon its independence . .
122. 148 CONG. REc. 12,115 (2002) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes).
123. 148 CONG. REc. 12,119 (2002) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
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Anybody who thinks this board is just going to slap around a few accountants does
not understand this bill. This board is going to have massive power, unchecked
power, by design. I would have to say the board that Senator Enzi and I set up in our
bill has massive unchecked power as well. I mean, that is the nature of what we are
trying to do here. I am not criticizing Senator Sarbanes. I am just reminding people
that there are two edges of this sword. We are setting up a board with massive power
that is going to make decisions that affect all accountants and everybody they work
for, which directly or indirectly is every breathing person in the country. They are
going to have massive unchecked powers. 24
When placed in full context, Senator Gramm's references to the PCAOB's
"massive unchecked powers" can hardly be dismissed, as the PCAOB has
urged, as a view from a"legislative opponent[ ].125 In fact, as Senator Gramm
candidly acknowledged, he initially opposed establishing the PCAOB because
he favored an alternative structure, proposed by Senator Enzi and himself, that
would have made the board "a little more independent of the SEC" by
providing for presidential appointment of the board's chairman and direct
appeals of board rulemaking and disciplinary sanctions to a federal district
court.126 Senator Gramm's statements provide powerful evidence that
Congress sought to create a PCAOB that was independent of the SEC to a
significant degree. And the fact that the Senator initially sought to persuade
his colleagues to support a board that was designed to be "a little more
independent of the SEC" should only bolster the accuracy of his assessment
of the Board for which he ultimately voted.
The legislative record also facilitates our understanding of why Congress
was particularly concerned about the PCAOB's ability to exercise independent
judgment in connection with auditor oversight: As the D.C. Circuit recognized
and acknowledged, "the level of Presidential control over the Board reflects
Congress's intention to insulate the Board from partisan forces."' 2 7 In
particular, Congress sought to avert the "extraordinary amount of political
pressure" previously directed at the SEC's Commissioners, when the SEC had
attempted during the 2000 election year to promulgate stricter requirements
for auditor independence.2 8 As Senator Paul Sarbanes recounted during a
124. Id.
125. Brief for Respondents Public Company Accounting Oversight Board et al., at 29, Free Enterprise
Fund v. Public Co. Account. Over. Bd., No. 08-861 (Oct. 13, 2009) (stating that the "views of legislative
opponents are hardly authoritative" and describing Senator Gramm as "the bill's 'main critic' who 'decided
at the last minute to vote for it') (quoting Cornwell, U.S. Congress Sends Corporate Reform Bill to Bush,
REUTERS NEWS, July 26, 2002).
126. See 148 CONG. REc. 12,120, 12,122 (2002) (statements of Sen. Gramm).
127. Free Enterprise Fund, 537 F.3d at 682.
128. Oversight Hearings, supra note 67, at 15 (statement by Arthur Levitt, former Chairman of the
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hearing, several witnesses had advised Congress that "if we can structure the
board well enough, it might actually have more independence from political
influence than the SEC would have."' 29 And Senator Debbie Stabenow raised
her own concern "about finding a better way to insulate the establishment of
accounting standards from politics and pressure, both from the industry, and
frankly, from Congress.' 30
Congress's intention to insulate the PCAOB from political influence and
partisan forces would be thwarted if the PCAOB could, in the words of the
D.C. Circuit, be "micromanag[ed]" by the SEC. 3 ' Recognizing that the past
is prologue, Congress feared that its own members and the President might be
tempted to persuade the SEC to adopt positions favored by their powerful
constituents and contributors. Congress also may have surmised that the SEC,
headed by a Chairman who serves at the pleasure of the President, and
composed (at the time) of a majority of members from the President's political
party, would be more inclined to favor the President's policy preferences.'
Accordingly, fueled with bipartisan spirit in the wake of the collapses of
Enron and WorldCom, Congress designed the PCAOB to be doubly insulated
from political and partisan pressure.
Public company accounting oversight could have been placed in a new
unit within the SEC-and that new unit could have been self-funded through
fees paid by public companies. 33 But a new unit within the SEC (even a self-
funded unit) would have been subject to the SEC's plenary control, and thus
SEC). See also ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET 139-40 (2002) (stating that the "Big Five firms,
their partners, and the AICPA pumped gobs of money into the election coffers of hundreds of Congressional
candidates and the Bush campaign" and noting that "[e]ach of the Big Five also appears on the list of
President Bush's top twenty contributors").
129. Id. at 1027 (statement by Sen. Paul Sarbanes).
130. Id. at 186 (statement by Sen. Debbie Stabenow).
13 1. Free Enterprise Fund, 537 F.3d at 683.
132. Cf Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So IndependentAgencies: Party Polarization and the
Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. Rav. 459, 462 (2008) (detailing empirical findings and
contending that "Presidents---once there is a majority of commissioners from the President's party-have
more influence on independent-agency policymaking than ever before"). At the time of Sarbanes-Oxley,
the SEC was chaired by Harvey Pitt, a Republican who had been appointed by President George W. Bush.
The other Commissioners were Cynthia Glassman (a Republican) and Issac Hunt (a Democrat). Two
Commissioner seats were vacant. See SEC Historical Summary of Chairman and Commissioners, available
at http://www.sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm. Democrats had a majority in the Senate;
Republicans had a majority in the House of Representatives.
133. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (discussing H.R. 5184, which would have
required the SEC to establish a self-funded Office of Audit Review within the Division of Corporate
Finance). Examples of federal entities that are self-funded include the Federal Reserve and the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). See Nagy, supra note 6, at 1026-27.
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the new unit would have more susceptible to indirect control by the President
and Congress.'34 Although subject to SEC oversight and enforcement
authority, Board members with fixed five-year terms and strict restrictions on
removal were far more likely to bring their independent judgment to bear on
the critical issues that faced the auditing industry in the wake of the scandals.
The PCAOB's independence from the SEC was not an end in itself, but rather
a means to the end of depoliticizing the PCAOB.
There is certainly an argument to be made that the PCAOB's design has
furthered the congressional goal of insulating the Board from political
influence and partisan forces.'35 But as we shall see in Part III of this Article,
the Constitution ensures that all governmental power is subject to
constitutional checks and balances, and some of these checks are derived from
the political process itself. The PCAOB's design may have been rooted in
pragmatism, but the PCAOB's double-decker independence fatally clashes
with the democratic accountability demanded by the Constitution.
C. The SRO Model
Congress patterned the PCAOB on the securities industry's self-
regulatory model, under which SROs, such as FINRA and the NYSE, exercise
substantial regulatory powers subject to SEC oversight.136 But there is a
simple reason why that model has not triggered the Appointments Clause and
separation of power challenges that are now being directed at the PCAOB:
SROs, such as the NASD (now FIINRA) and the NYSE, are not created by the
government, and their officials are not appointed by the government.'
Accordingly, the NYSE and FINRA, unlike the PCAOB, are not part of the
134. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And
It Just Might Work), 35 CONN. L. REv. 915, 981 (2003) (observing that Congress could have reposed all
power to set accounting and auditing standards "in the SEC itself," but contending that such "sole direct
power could further politicize the standard-setting process").
135. But see Fed. Commc'n Comm'n v. Fox Television Station, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1815 (2009)
(observing that "independent agencies are sheltered not from politics but from the President,.. . and their
freedom from presidential oversight (and protection) has simply been replaced by increased subservience
to congressional direction").
136. See Free Enterprise Fund, 537 F.3d at 683 n.13 (concluding that the PCAOB is not "an
unprecedented Congressional innovation" because the SEC's "wide-ranging oversight over the Board was
modeled after the rules" regarding SEC authority over SROs).
137. See Nagy, supra note 6, at 1022-25 (observing that both the NYSE and the Investment Bankers
Association of America (a trade group that later restructured to become the NASD) "were formed at the
initiative of securities brokers and firms long before Congress enveloped them in a regulatory scheme" and
emphasizing that neither the NYSE, nor FINRA, have a governmentally-appointed board).
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"government itself' under Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. ,138 and
NYSE and FINRA officials are not federal officers or employees for purposes
of the Appointments Clause.'39
The SRO model is nonetheless important to our understanding of the
structural relationship between the PCAOB and the SEC. Because the
statutory provisions granting the SEC oversight and enforcement authority
over the PCAOB are virtually identical to the statutory provisions providing
for SEC oversight and enforcement authority over the NYSE and FINRA, the
SEC's 70-year history with SRO rulemaking, investigations, and enforcement
tells us much about the SEC's ability to "direct and supervise" or otherwise
control the PCAOB.
The similarities between the PCAOB and the NYSE and FINRA are
striking. As with the PCAOB, Congress has delegated substantial rulemaking,
enforcement, and adjudicatory powers to these private self-regulators, with
each SRO's recordkeeping, rulemaking, and disciplinary actions subject to
SEC oversight.40 The SEC may also "by rule.., abrogate, add to, and delete
from" the rules of an SRO. 4 ' Moreover, as with the PCAOB, the SEC has
enforcement authority over the SROs. Specifically, the SEC may, by order,
suspend or revoke the registration of an SRO, or "censure or impose
limitations on the activities, functions, and operations" of an SRO, upon a
finding that the SRO has either violated, or is unable to comply with the law
or, "without reasonable justification or excuse, has failed to enforce" any
member firm's or any associated person's compliance with any such provision
or rule.'42 The SEC may also remove any SRO officer or director for willful
violations of law or abuses of authority.'43 Finally, as with the PCAOB, the
SEC may, by rule, "relieve" an SRO of any of its enforcement responsibilities
under the Exchange Act.'44
138. Lebron, 513 U.S. at 400.
139. See Nagy, supra note 6, at 1022-25.
140. See Exchange Act §§ 17(a) and (b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78q(a) and (b) (2006); Exchange Act §§ 19(b)
and (d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s(b) and (d) (2006).
141. Exchange Act § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c).
142. Exchange Act, § 19(h)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(1).
143. Exchange Act § 19(h)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(4).
144. Exchange Act § 19(g)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g)(2). To the extent that there are differences between
the PCAOB and the NYSE and FINRA beyond the critical distinction of the PCAOB's governmental
creation and appointment of members, these differences are principally designed to make the PCAOB an
even more powerful regulator than the SROs. These differences include: the PCAOB's guaranteed source
of funding through statutorily mandated accounting support fees paid by public companies, 15 U.S.C.
§ 7219(d)(1) (2006); a means for the PCAOB to subpoena testimony and documents (from persons other
than registered accounting firms and their employees) through requests to the SEC, 15 U.S.C.
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The SRO model thus provides for SEC oversight and enforcement
authority over the private self-regulators in the securities industry. But the
NYSE and the FINRA exercise substantial autonomy and discretion,
notwithstanding the SEC's authority, and the SEC does not control these
SROs at every significant step. As former SEC Chairman Justice William 0.
Douglas once explained, the SRO model in the securities industry lets "the
exchanges take the leadership with Government playing a residual role.
Government would keep the shotgun, so to speak, behind the door, loaded,
well oiled, cleaned, ready for use, but with the hope it would never have to be
used." '145 Although Congress revised the statutory scheme in 1975 to provide
for additional SEC oversight and enforcement authority over the SROs (as
reflected in the provisions discussed above), the fundamental framework
recognized by Justice Douglas has remained unchanged.'46
Title I of Sarbanes-Oxley reflects a similar congressional intention to
assign "leadership" over the accounting industry to the PCAOB, with the SEC
playing the "residual role." The statutory design ensured that the PCAOB
would take leadership in the area ofrulemaking-with the PCAOB' s authority
described as "plenary."' 47 PCAOB leadership was also expected vis-a-vis key
executive functions involving inspections and investigations of, and
enforcement actions against, auditors of public companies. The fact that the
SEC can theoretically pick up a well-oiled "shotgun" sometime in the future
does not make the SEC the superior of the PCAOB for the present while that
shotgun remains behind the door.
To be sure, the Supreme Court has described the SEC's "supervisory
authority" over the SROs as "extensive" and "pervasive."' 45 The Court,
however, made those observations in the context of the SEC's statutory
responsibility to review and approve proposed SRO rules.'49 Because no SRO
§ 7215(b)(2)(D) (2006); immunity for PCAOB officials "to the same extent as an employee of the Federal
Government in similar circumstances," § 7215(b)(6); and a statutory privilege from third party discovery
of PCAOB materials, § 7215(b)(5).
145. WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 82 (James Allen ed., 1940) (cited in Silver
v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 292, 352 (1963)).
146. See Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange Act
Release No. 50699, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,126, at 71,128 (Dec. 8,2004) (stating that while "the Commission has
ultimate responsibility for oversight of the U.S. securities markets and their participants, the SROs continue
to have 'front-line' responsibility for overseeing trading on their markets and their members' compliance
with applicable statutory and regulatory provisions").
147. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (quoting statement by Sen. Sarbanes).
148. United States v. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694, 732-33 (1975).
149. See id.
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rule can become effective over the SEC's objection, 5° a large part of SRO
rulemaking is clearly subject to the SEC's supervision. But rulemaking
agendas are generally set by the SROs-not by the SEC. The SEC suggests
new initiatives, provides input and feedback, and may threaten to step in with
the agency's own rules in instances of SRO inaction. Yet when it comes to
their own rulemaking, SROs seldom act under the SEC's direction.' 51
Consequently, SRO rules are only rarely considered "state action" for
purposes of constitutional protections or requirements in federal statutes.
52
The SEC also performs an extensive role as reviewer of SRO disciplinary
sanctions and, thus, no SRO member or associated person may be subject to
discipline over the SEC' s objection. 53 Yet the SEC's de novo review authority
over SRO sanctions does not alter the fact that SROs typically operate with
substantial discretion and autonomy, free from SEC control, in all of the many
steps leading up to those disciplinary sanctions. Although SROs are required
under the Exchange Act "to provide a fair procedure for the disciplining of
members,' 54 SROs generally conduct their investigations, enforcement
determinations, and adjudications free from dictates by the SEC.
Indeed, for purposes of constitutional protections such as the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination, the SEC and courts have
consistently refused to regard SRO action as "state action" precisely because
SRO investigations and disciplinary proceedings are not conducted under the
direction and supervision of the SEC. 55 Only on those infrequent occasions
150. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text (discussing Exchange Act provisions with
respect to SEC review of SRO rulemaking).
151. Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt devotes an entire chapter of his book to the topic of
securities analysts and the conflicts of interest they faced in connection with their "sell-side" research and
recommendations. LEVITT, supra note 128, at 70-92. The chapter discusses in great detail the SEC's multi-
year struggle to convince the SROs to "come up with a new code of conduct for analysts." Id. at 73.
152. See, e.g., Desiderio v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 191 F.3d 198, 207 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding
that the SEC's "mere approval" of a rule on an NASD form is not sufficient to constitute state action, and
emphasizing that the SEC would be responsible for the NASD rule "only where it exercised coercive power
or provided significant encouragement").
153. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (discussing Exchange Act provisions with respect
to SEC review of SRO disciplinary sanctions).
154. Exchange Act § 15A(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(8) (2006).
155. See, e.g., D.L. Cromwell Inv., Inc. v. NASD Regulation, Inc., 279 F.3d 155, 161 (2d Cir. 2002)
(stating that the Fifth Amendment "will constrain a private entity only insofar as its actions are found to
be 'fairly attributable' to the government" (citing Lugarv. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,937 (1982)));
United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding no violation of the Fifth Amendment where
the government relied on testimony that was compelled in an NYSE investigation). See generally Alan
Lawhead, Useful Limits to the Fifth Amendment: Examining the Benefits that Flow From A Private
Regulator's Ability to Demand Answers to its Questions During an Investigation, 2009 COLUM. Bus. L.
REv. 1, 256-58 (citing cases and concluding that the "uniform result reached by lower federal courts and
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in which the SRO engages in "joint action" with the SEC or the DOJ, or when
the government uses coercive power or "significantly encourages" SRO
action, can "state action" be claimed.'
In a typical SRO investigation, however, such government coercion or
joint action is not present. As one FINRA official has explained,
FINRA's investigations are not pre-cleared by the SEC. The SEC has no statutory
authority, and therefore no coercive power to order FINRA to litigate any specific
case. The initiative for typical cases is entirely FINRA's. FINRA investigates, files
a complaint, and litigates the case, all without any government approval or pressure
to do so. Because the decisions are made by FINRA, FINRA is not a state actor
under the government compulsion test."3 7
Moreover, under "joint-action" analysis, facts demonstrating cooperation
between an SRO and the SEC will rarely render an SRO a state actor,' and
"the mere fact of such collaboration is generally insufficient, standing alone,
to demonstrate state action."'5
With respect to SRO disciplinary proceedings, both the SEC and federal
courts have routinely depicted the SEC's role as a limited one. As the SEC has
itself emphasized,
SRO proceedings are not initiated by a government agency, nor does their initiation
require our approval. We do not participate in the disciplinary proceeding before the
SRO, and we do not control when the SRO begins or concludes its determination.
Our sole responsibility in this context arises when an SRO imposes a final
disciplinary sanction on a person who seeks review of the SRO's determination from
this Commission. 6"
the SEC has been that FINRA, NASD, and the New York Stock Exchange are private actors"). But see
Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations Be Considered Government
Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 151, 171-78 (2008) (observing thatjudicial decisions regarding SRO
immunity are very difficult to reconcile with constitutional decisions concluding that SROs are not state
actors).
156. Lawhead, supra note 155, at 248-56 (discussing "government compulsion" and "joint action"
tests for state action); Karmel, supra note 155, at 177-81.
157. See Lawhead, supra note 155, at 250.
158. See D.L. Cromwell nv., 279 F.3d at 161.
159. See, e.g.,In re Frank Quattrone, Release No. 53547, 87 S.E.C. Docket 1847,1851-52 (Mar. 24,
2006) (emphasizing that "cooperation between the Commission and the NASD will rarely render NASD
a state actor," but holding that respondent "proffered enough evidence concerning the Joint Investigation
to earn an evidentiary hearing").
160. In re Larry Ira Klein, Release No. 34-37835, 63 SEC Docket 52, 58 (Oct. 17, 1996) (ruling that
NASD disciplinary proceedings need not conform to 28 U.S.C. § 2462's five-year statute of limitations
generally applicable in government proceedings where a sanction is sought).
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Lower courts have likewise described the SEC's role in SRO disciplinary
proceedings as involving "adjudication."' 61
In resolving the constitutional questions presented in Free Enterprise
Fund, the Supreme Court should consider the effect that its decision is likely
to have on SROs such as FINRA and the NYSE. If the SRO model is one that
provides for "a vast degree of Commission control at every significant
step,"'62 then SROs are essentially alter egos of the SEC, and most of their
actions would constitute "state action" that is subject to the Constitution and
possibly a host of federal statutes. If, however, the SRO model is one that
provides for SEC oversight and enforcement authority, but nonetheless
permits the SROs to operate with substantial discretion and autonomy, then
under that model, the SROs, and by extension the PCAOB, cannot be said to
be operating under the SEC's "extraordinary" direction and supervision. The
Supreme Court can avoid effectively overturning decades of "state action"
precedent by concluding that the D.C. Circuit has misconstrued the SRO
model on which the PCAOB was patterned.
D. The Nondelegation Doctrine
The complaint in Free Enterprise Fund alleged that the PCAOB's
structure suffered from three distinct constitutional infirmities: the
Appointments Clause and separation of powers claims that are now before the
Supreme Court, and a third claim of unconstitutional delegation. More
specifically, this third claim alleged that Congress's "grant of wide-ranging
authority to the Board" constituted an unconstitutional delegation of
"legislative power to an entity outside of the Legislative Branch."' 63 The
district judge granted the PCAOB summary judgment with respect to all three
claims, 6' and Petitioners opted to appeal only the Appointments Clause and
separation of powers rulings. 65 Given the fact that the Supreme Court has not
161. See, e.g., Jones v. SEC, 115 F.3d 1173, 1181 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that neither the Fifth
Amendment's Double Jeopardy clause nor collateral estoppel prevented the SEC from instituting its own
enforcement action, because "as reviewer" of an NASD disciplinary proceeding, "the SEC does not become
a party; its review role is an adjudicatory one").
162. Free Enterprise Fund, 537 F.3d at 683.
163. Complaint at 95, Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 2007
WL 891675 (D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2007).
164. See Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 2007 WL 891675
(D.D.C. Mar. 21, 2007).
165. Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir.
2008).
[Vol. 71:361
HeinOnline -- 71 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 390 2009-2010
2010] IS THE PCAOB A "HEAVILY CONTROLLED COMPONENT"? 391
invalidated a federal statute on nondelegation grounds since 1936,66
Petitioners' decision to abandon their nondelegation claim was undoubtedly
a wise one. Yet the so-called "nondelegation doctrine" is essential to an
understanding of why Congress structured the PCAOB in the way that it did,
and therefore informs the Court's constitutional analysis under the
Appointments Clause and the doctrine of separation of powers.
Congress routinely delegates to both public and private entities the power
to make rules and set standards, and the modem constitutional constraints on
such delegations are minimal.167 When applied to congressional grants of
power to public entities, the nondelegation doctrine prohibits only those
delegations that fail to articulate an "intelligible principle" to which the public
entity must conform. 6 Accordingly, modem courts have consistently held
that Congress may vest federal agencies with vast rulemaking power, provided
it is not "standardless."' 69 Viewing the PCAOB as a federal entity,7 0 and
quoting Sarbanes-Oxley's provision that PCAOB rules must be "'necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors,"" 7 the
district court found that Congress provided "'intelligible' standards" to guide
the PCAOB in its rulemaking.'72 The court therefore concluded that the
"legislative delegation effected by the Act is squarely within the bounds of
modem non-delegation doctrine."'7
166. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Panama Refinery Co. v. Ryan, 239 U.S. 388 (1936).
167. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1367, 1369
(2003) (observing that private entities "perform tasks that appear quintessentially governmental, such as
promulgating standards or regulating third-party activities"); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 547 (2000) (noting that "[a] variety of nongovernmental actors,
including corporations, public interest organizations, private standard setting bodies, professional
organizations, and nonprofit groups, engage in 'public' decision making in myriad ways").
168. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (emphasizing that Congress
must articulate "an intelligible principle" to guide an agency's discretion when it delegates rulemaking
authority to an administrative agency, but finding that the Clean Air Act did contain an "intelligible
principle").
169. Id. at 473 (rejecting the D.C. Circuit Court's suggestion that an "agency can cure an
unconstitutionally standardless delegation of power by declining to exercise some of that power").
170. See Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Over. Bd., 2007 WL 891675 at *5 n.2 (2007)
(stating that "the PCAOB will be considered a public entity for non-delegation analysis as well").
171. Id. at *5 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 7213(a)(1)).
172. Id. (holding that the Act's provisions "are 'intelligible' standards within the meaning of
Whitman" and citing the Court's acknowledgment that it found "intelligible principles" in "various statutes
authorizing regulation in the 'public interest"'); see Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474.
173. Free Enterprise Fund, WL 891675 at *5. Scholars have debated whether the Constitution's text
and history supports such a doctrine. Compare Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1721, 1722 (2002) (arguing that "there just is no constitutional
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Yet even if the district court had viewed the PCAOB as a private entity
for purposes of the nondelegation doctrine, Congress's grant of power to the
PCAOB undoubtedly would have survived constitutional scrutiny.
Congressional delegations of rulemaking power to private entities raise
substantial concerns about how that power will be utilized. As the Supreme
Court observed in Carter Coal, "[t]his is legislative delegation in its most
obnoxious form; for it is not even delegation to an official or official body,
presumptively disinterested, but to private persons whose interests may be and
often are adverse to the interests of others in the same business."'74 But the
Supreme Court has made clear that governmental oversight of private
decision-making will nonetheless insulate such congressional delegations from
constitutional challenge.' Accordingly, because no PCAOB rule, disciplinary
sanction, or "accounting support fee" can take effect over the SEC's objection,
the Act's provision for SEC oversight would have shielded the PCAOB from
"nondelegation" attack just as SEC oversight over rulemaking and discipline
has insulated the NYSE and NASD from constitutional challenges on grounds
of nondelegation."
This so-called "private" nondelegation doctrine provides the most
compelling explanation for why Congress structured the PCAOB in the way
that it did. Recall Senator Gramm's statement that "[w]e want it to be private,
but we want it to have governmental powers. We have tried to structure it in
ways to try to accommodate this."'7 The SEC's oversight and enforcement
nondelegation rule, nor has there ever been"), with Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the
Nondelegation Doctrine's Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297 (2003) (advancing
textual and historical arguments for the nondelegation doctrine). See also Gary Lawson, Delegation and
Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REv. 327, 330 (2002) ("The nondelegation doctrine ... is the Energizer
Bunny of constitutional law: No matter how many times it gets broken, beaten, or buried, it just keeps on
going and going."); Symposium, The Phoenix Rises Again: The Nondelegation Doctrine from
Constitutional and Policy Perspectives, 20 CARDOZO L. REv. 731 (1999).
174. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936). The Court previously criticized a
congressional delegation to private groups when it invalidated the National Recovery Act in A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542 (1935).
175. See, e.g., Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381,398-400 (1940) (upholding
a post-Carter Coal version of the Bituminous Coal Act that allowed private coal boards to set rules
governing the sale of coal, with the board's rulemaking subject to approval, disapproval, or modification
by the government's Bituminous Coal Commission).
176. See, e.g., R.H. Johnson & Co. v. SEC, 198 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965) (concluding that Exchange
Act Section 15A did not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of power to the NASD because of the
SEC's authority to disapprove NASD rules and review NASD disciplinary actions); Todd & Co. v. SEC,
557 F.2d 1008, 1012-14 (3d Cir. 1977) (upholding delegation of broker-dealer registration because the
NASD's rules and disciplinary actions "were subject to full review by the S.E.C., a wholly public body,
which must base its decision on its own findings").
177. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (quoting statement of Sen. Gramm).
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authority over the PCAOB was a necessary "accommodation" because in the
absence of such SEC authority, Congress's grant of rulemaking power to a
"private" PCAOB would have been constitutionally doomed. Senator Gramm
explicitly acknowledged this "accommodation" when he compared his and
Senator Enzi's alternative board with the PCAOB: "[o]urs is a little more
independent of the SEC; though in the end, to meet the constitutional test, the
SEC had to have authority over it." '78 The private nondelegation doctrine is
very likely the "constitutional test" to which Senator Gramm was referring.
The private nondelegation doctrine also provides a far more satisfactory
answer to a question posed by the D.C. Circuit majority. Emphasizing the
Act's "sweeping" provisions for SEC oversight and enforcement, the majority
asked rhetorically: "why has Congress granted such pervasive Commission
authority over the Board if not to preserve the means of Executive control?"' 79
But the majority's supposition that Congress sought to "preserve the means
of Executive control" is undercut by Congress's mistaken impression that the
PCAOB was not "an agency or establishment of the Federal Government."'8 0
In all likelihood, Congress did not consider itself obligated to preserve "a
means of Executive control" over the PCAOB. Nor is it likely that Congress
considered itself restrained by the text of the Appointments Clause:18" ' the Act
states explicitly that "[n]o member or person employed by... the Board shall
be deemed to be an officer or employee of or agent for the Federal
Government by reason of such service."'8 2
Congress was, however, acutely aware of the constitutional restraints on
delegations to private regulators, and was understandably concerned that its
delegation of vast rulemaking, adjudicative, and taxing authority to the
PCAOB not run afoul of the Constitution. Thus, the control that Congress
sought to preserve was largely legislative; neither Sarbanes-Oxley's text nor
its legislative history evidence congressional concern with respect to executive
control.
178. 148 CONG. REC. 12,120 (2002) (statement of Sen. Gramm) (emphasis added).
179. Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 537 F.3d 667,683 (D.C.
Cir. 2008).
180. 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (b) (2006).
181. Cf Walter Dellinger, The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President and
Congress, 63 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 513, 535 (2000) (memorandum stating that "[t]he Appointments
Clause simply is not implicated when significant authority is devolved upon non-federal actors").
182. 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (b).
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PART THREE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
As I stated at the outset of this Article, the Free Enterprise Fund case
envelops constitutional law in securities law. By examining the text of
Sarbanes-Oxley and the events leading up to its passage, a clear "securities
law" story emerges. Simply put, in creating the PCAOB as the accounting
industry's overseer, Congress wanted it all: It wanted a strong, independent,
private sector regulator with governmental powers, free from partisan forces
and political influence. Yet Congress was unwilling to allow the accounting
industry, working with the SEC, to establish its own regulator; nor was
Congress willing to allow the private sector to select the new regulator's
leadership. The Maloney Act model-culminating with the establishment of
the NASD in 1938-allowed "too many issues to remain open to debate even
after Congress has acted." '83 So Congress established a strong, independent
board appointed by the SEC, and subjected that board to oversight in certain
well-delineated areas.
Constitutional law-the Constitution and the body of Supreme Court
decisions interpreting the Constitution-tells us that Congress cannot have it
all. As "the government itself," the PCAOB is subject to constitutional checks
and balances, including the commands of the Appointments Clause and the
doctrine of separation of powers. These checks and balances help to "ensure
that those who wield[ ]" government power are "accountable to political force
and the will of the people."'8 4 These checks and balances also "allow[ ]the
citizen to know who may be called to answer for making, or not making, those
delicate and necessary decisions essential to governance." '' I 5
The PCAOB's structure and design accords the PCAOB substantial
discretion and autonomy without imposing constitutionally sufficient
accountability. Indeed, no elected official is directly responsible for
appointing or removing the PCAOB members who promulgate rules, perform
inspections, investigate suspected violations, prosecute firms and accountants,
impose disciplinary sanctions, and levy taxes on public companies. Instead,
the President appoints, and the Senate confirms, the SEC Commissioners who
are charged with overseeing the PCAOB, with SEC Commissioners
themselves insulated from presidential and congressional control to a
significant degree.'86
183. See supra text accompanying note 72 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 107-414, at 48).
184. Freytag v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 884 (1991).
185. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757-58 (1996).
186. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1829 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
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The pursuit of policy through PCAOB-like entities is worrisome because
it places elected officials in a position where they will benefit regardless of the
actual outcomes of those policies. That is, as I argued in my first article on the
PCAOB, through the use of such doubly insulated regulators, "Congress and
the President can claim credit for the ingenuity that resulted in regulatory
successes and they can avoid blame for the... regulator's unpopular decisions
or unwise policies."'87 But the general public ultimately loses under this
scenario because blurred lines of accountability compromise the effective
functioning of a representative democracy, and the more confusion that is
created, "the lesser the likelihood that voters can express accurate preferences
for retaining or removing elected officials."' 88 The pursuit of policy through
congressionally created "private" regulators like the PCAOB is all the more
troubling because such "private" regulators may exercise vast regulatory
power unfettered by the FOIA, APA, and other administrative statutes
designed to curb administrative discretion and otherwise ensure that
policymaking is rational, transparent, and accountable.'89
This Article, of course, is incomplete absent a fuller discussion as to how
the constitutional analysis is affected by a negative answer to the question
posed by its title. If the PCAOB is not "a heavily controlled component" of the
SEC, and if the Board's exercise of its statutory duties is not "subject to check
by the Commission at every significant step," then its structure cannot be
reconciled with the Supreme Court's Appointments Clause and separation of
powers precedents. Section A explains why the PCAOB's five members are
"principal" officers who, under the Appointments Clause, must be appointed
by the President with advice and consent by the Senate. Section B explains
why Congress's decision to vest the PCAOB appointment and removal power
in the SEC violates the doctrine of separation of powers.
(observing that independent regulatory agencies possess "comparative freedom from ballot-box control"
because they "enjoy an independence expressly designed to insulate them, to a degree, from 'the exercise
of political oversight' (quoting Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 916 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment))).
187. Nagy, supra note 6, at 1065. See generally DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT
RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993).
188. Nagy, supra note 6, at 1065. See also Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political
Accountability, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507, 1509 (2001) (stating that "the clarity of responsibility for an
action or policy involves the degree to which the body politic can discern who in the political system is
responsible for a decision, policy, or activity, so that efforts to exert political influence can be directed to
the proper authorities").
189. Nagy, supra note 6, at 1062.
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A. The Appointments Clause
The Appointments Clause in Article II of the Constitution divides
"Officers of the United States" into two categories: principal officers and
inferior officers. 9 ' Principal officers must be appointed by the President,
subject to the "Advice and Consent of the Senate."' 9 ' In contrast, "Congress
may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments."' 92 As the Supreme Court emphasized in Edmond v. United
States,93 the Appointments Clause "is more than a matter of 'etiquette or
protocol;' it is among the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional
scheme."'94
Sarbanes-Oxley's provision for SEC appointment of the PCAOB's five
members contravenes the plain text of the Appointments Clause because the
members of the PCAOB do not qualify as "inferior" officers who may be
appointed by the Head of a Department. According to Edmond: "[w]hether
one is an 'inferior' officer depends on whether he has a superior."'9 5 SEC
Commissioners who cannot remove PCAOB members in connection with
even substantial disagreements about matters of policy can hardly qualify as
the PCAOB's "superiors. '' 96
Edmond further clarified that inferior officers "are officers whose work
is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by
Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate."' 97 Yet by
channeling the SEC's oversight role toward the PCAOB's final rules and
disciplinary sanctions, Congress ensured that the PCAOB would remain free
to pursue its own policy preferences, particularly with respect to decisions
relating to its rulemaking priorities as well as its investigative and
enforcement determinations. As we saw in Part II of this Article, Congress
viewed the Board's independence as essential to the success of the PCAOB's
regulatory mission.'98
190. U.S. CONST., art. 1I, § 2, cl. 2.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. 520 U.S. 651 (1997).
194. Id. at 659 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976) (per curium)).
195. Id. at 662.
196. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
197. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 663.
198. See supra notes 127-35 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, even if the D.C. majority were correct in its claim that the SEC
has the power "to limit and to remove Board authority altogether,"'99 this SEC
power to sanction the PCAOB does not transform the SEC Commissioners
into the Board members' "supervisors" while that power remains unexercised.
Congress possesses an analogous power "to limit and to remove [SEC]
authority altogether" through bicameral legislation-amendments to the
federal securities laws or by withholding appropriations. Yet Congress's
unexercised ability to limit the functions of the SEC, or its unexercised ability
to abolish the agency entirely, does not make Congress the "supervisors" of
the SEC's five Commissioners. Nor does the possibility that it could exercise
its "at-will removal power over [SEC] functions" at some future point in time
provide Congress with direction and supervision over the execution of the law.
If it did, then the SEC and all other independent regulatory agencies subject
to congressional oversight and appropriation would be unconstitutional under
Bowsher v. Synar.200 In that decision the Court emphasized that "[t]he
Constitution does not contemplate an active role for Congress in the
supervision of officers charged with the execution of the laws it enacts." ''
Accordingly, the SEC's unexercised "at-will removal power over Board
functions" cannot constitute constitutionally sufficient direction and
supervision for purposes of the Appointments Clause.
In determining whether the PCAOB is "directed and supervised" by the
SEC within the meaning of Edmond, the Supreme Court should also consider
the SEC's own incentives for adhering to the congressional vision of a
"strong, independent" PCAOB. If the SEC were to utilize its broad rulemaking
authority under Sarbanes-Oxley to promulgate rules that resulted in "increased
micromanaging of Board operations," ' Congress would likely view such
action as an affront to the PCAOB's carefully constructed design. The fact
that no such rules have been promulgated hardly comes as a surprise.
Likewise, while Congress gave the SEC the responsibility to review and
approve the PCAOB's budget and the "accounting support fee" that funds that
budget,2"3 this theoretical "power of the purse" is tempered by Congress's
ultimate control over the SEC's own purse. The value that Congress placed on
the PCAOB's strength and independence serves as an important check on the
199. Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 537 F.3d 667,680 (D.C.
Cir. 2008).
200. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986).
201. Id.
202. Free Enterprise Fund, 537 F.3d at 676 n.6.
203. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
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SEC's exercise of its oversight responsibilities and, as a practical matter,
ensures that the PCAOB does not operate with a "vast degree of Commission
control at every significant step.""2 4
In addition, the Supreme Court should consider the PCAOB's vast array
of regulatory powers, and should contrast that to the powers that were at issue
in other Appointments Clause cases, including Edmond and Morrison v.
Olson."5 Edmond involved a challenge by service members to an affirmance
of their court-martial conviction by the Coast Guard Court of Criminal
Appeals, an intermediate judicial tribunal within the military justice system.0 6
These Coast Guard judges were appointed by the Secretary of Transportation
and their powers were tied exclusively to their adjudicatory function.20 7 The
Court found that the Coast Guard Judges were "inferior officers" because they
had superiors and their "work [was] directed and supervised at some level by
others" who were principal officers.08 Specifically, decisions by Coast Guard
judges were subject to further review by the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces,20 9 and Coast Guard judges were also subject to "administrative
oversight" by the Coast Guard Judge Advocate General (JAG) who had the
authority to remove a "[Coast Guard] judge from his judicial assignment
without cause," and who was himself supervised by the Secretary of
Transportation."'
Had Sarbanes-Oxley limited the PCAOB's regulatory authority to the
conduct of disciplinary proceedings reviewable by the SEC, then PCAOB
members could be said to be "directed and supervised" by the SEC within the
meaning of Edmond. But as we have seen, PCAOB members also have
significant rulemaking, investigative, and prosecutorial authority, and much
of this policymaking discretion is insulated, by statutory design, from SEC
control.2t ' Unlike the administrative oversight conducted by the Coast Guard
204. Free Enterprise Fund, 537 F.3d at 683.
205. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
206. 520 U.S. 651, 653 (1997).
207. Id. at 658.
208. Id. at 663.
209. Id. at 665. The Court acknowledged that the scope of review by the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces was narrower than that exercised by the Coast Guard judges because facts were not
reevaluated as long as there was some "competent evidence in the record to establish each element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. Yet this limitation upon review did not render Coast Guard judges
"principal officers." According to the Court, "what is significant is that [Coast Guard judges] have no
power to render a final decision on behalf of the United States unless permitted to do so by other Executive
officers." Id.
210. Id. at 664 (stating that "[t]he power to remove officers... is a powerful tool for control").
211. See supra notes 127-35 and accompanying text.
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JAG, Sarbanes-Oxley ensured that the SEC does not possess "the powerful
tool" of at-will removal.1 2
Likewise, the independent counsel's investigative and prosecutorial
authority at issue in Morrison v. Olson213 constitutes a subset of the powers
assigned to the PCAOB in Sarbanes-Oxley. The independent counsel did not
have the power to enact rules with the force of law for an entire profession,
nor did she have the ability to adjudicate her own prosecutions. In evaluating
her exclusively executive authority, and in reaching the conclusion that the
independent counsel was an "inferior officer" who could properly be
appointed by a "court of law," the Supreme Court relied on four factors: that
she was subject to for-cause removal by "a higher Executive Branch official"
(the Attorney General, who serves at the pleasure of the President); 24 that she
was empowered "to perform only certain, limited duties";215 that her
jurisdiction was narrow;2  and that her "office [was] limited in tenure. ' '2"
PCAOB members, in contrast, are removable only for-cause (defined
restrictively) by SEC Commissioners who themselves are insulated from
direct Presidential control. Moreover, PCAOB members have broad statutory
duties that may be expanded even further by the SEC or the Board itself;211
they have jurisdiction over every registered public accounting firm and their
associated persons; and they have tenure that extends for five years and not in
any way tied to a particular person, investigation, or issue.
Finally, unlike either Edmond or Morrison, Free Enterprise Fund is not
a case where the Supreme Court can simply defer to Congress's judgment that
newly created federal officers are "inferior officers" within the meaning of the
Appointments Clause. Rather, as emphasized previously, Sarbanes-Oxley
states explicitly that no member of the PCAOB shall be deemed an "officer
212. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (discussing Sarbanes-Oxley's provisions limiting
PCAOB member removal to instances of willful misconduct or unjustifiable transgressions).
213. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
214. Id. at 671.
215. Id. (observing that although the Act delegated to the independent counsel "full power and
independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions and powers of the Department
of Justice," the grant of authority "[did] not include any authority to formulate policy for the Government
or Executive Branch ... ").
216. The Court elaborated that "[not only is the Act itself restricted in applicability to certain federal
officials suspected of certain serious federal crimes, but an independent counsel can act only within the
scope of the jurisdiction that has been granted by the Special Division pursuant to a request by the Attorney
General." Id. at 672.
217. Id. (emphasizing that the office was a temporary appointment "essentially to accomplish a single
task [at the end of which] the office is terminated").
218. See supra note 29 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (c)(5) (2006)).
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or employee of or agent for the Federal Government by reason of such
service. '  Congress was likely operating under the misimpression that
PCAOB board members would be private sector officials akin to the officials
who head the NYSE and the NASD (now FINRA). Thus, the task now falls
directly on the Supreme Court to situate the PCAOB within the federal
government. Both Sarbanes-Oxley's text and its legislative history command
a finding that PCAOB members are principal officers who must be appointed
by the President with advice and consent from the Senate.
B. The Doctrine of Separation of Powers
The constitutional doctrine of separation of powers is a structural
safeguard that enforces the Framers' decision to "dispers[e] the federal power
among the three branches-the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial
... ,"220 The doctrine ensures that one branch of government does not
encroach on the duties and responsibilities of another branch, and that power
is not aggrandized by one branch at the expense of another.22" ' As the Supreme
Court has recognized, "[t]he ultimate purpose of this separation of powers is
to protect the liberty and security of the governed." '222 Accordingly, even if
Congress and the President are comfortable with the manner in which the
responsibility or power was redistributed, actions that violate the separation
of powers doctrine must be declared unconstitutional.223
In structuring the PCAOB as an entity that is doubly insulated from
partisan forces and political pressure, Congress impermissibly interfered with
the President's Article H executive powers. Congress's unconstitutional
interference is most evident in the Act's provision for five-year fixed terms
with explicit limitations on the removal of PCAOB members. The Supreme
Court made clear in Humphrey's Executor v. United States224 that Congress
may create regulatory entities that exercise significant executive power,
notwithstanding the fact that the officials who head those entities are insulated
from direct presidential control by their fixed terms and limited removal.225
219. See supra text accompanying note 32 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 7211(b)).
220. Metro. Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S.
252, 272 (1991).
221. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (per curium).
222. Metro. Washington, 501 U.S. at 272.
223. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942 n. 13 (1983) (stating that "[tihe assent of the Executive to a
bill which contains a provision contrary to the Constitution does not shield it from judicial review").
224. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
225. Id. See also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
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But the officials who head those independent entities must be removable by
the President for cause,"' or must be removable by an alter ego of the
President for cause. 2 7 As an independent regulatory agency whose
commissioners serve for fixed terms, the SEC is itself insulated from
presidential control to a substantial degree, and thus does not function as an
"alter ego" of the President.228 Moreover, even if SEC Commissioners could
appropriately function as presidential surrogates, the statutory limitations on
the SEC's ability to remove PCAOB members prevent the SEC from asserting
meaningful control over the PCAOB's decisions regarding inspections,
investigations, and enforcement actions.229 Accordingly, the statute's
restrictive provisions for SEC-only removal of PCAOB members contravene
both Humphrey's Executor and Morrison and provide "no means for the
President to ensure the 'faithful execution' of the laws. 23°
Like the Act's provision for SEC removal of PCAOB officials,
Congress's decision to lodge the appointment power in the SEC further
attenuates the President's control over the PCAOB, and thus further
compromises the separation of powers. The SEC's power to appoint PCAOB
officials deprives the President of the ability to choose like-minded members
who share his policy goals and preferences. As the current Solicitor General
recognized in a 2001 article, "[a]s a practical matter, successful insulation of
administration from the President--even if accomplished in the name of
'independence'-will tend to enhance Congress's own authority over the
insulated activities. '23 ' Thus, while the Act's provisions for the appointment
and removal of PCAOB members do not constitute direct congressional
aggrandizement of power, these provisions nonetheless produce that effect.
Under Humphrey's Executor and Morrison, the Constitution does not
prohibit Congress from enhancing its power through the creation of
independent regulatory agencies like the SEC. However, the Supreme Court
should not extend those decisions to allow Congress to accumulate even more
power through the creation of a regulator such as the PCAOB that is further
226. Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 625-26.
227. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 692 (stating that "because the independent counsel may be terminated
for 'good cause,' the Executive, through the Attorney General, retains ample authority to assure that the
counsel is completely performing his or her statutory responsibilities in a manner that comports with the
provisions of the Act").
228. See Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 628 (stating that independent agencies "cannot in any proper
sense be characterized as an arm or an eye of the executive").
229. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
230. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 692.
231. Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REv. 2245, 2271 n.93 (2001).
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detached from Presidential appointment and removal. Constitutional clashes
over the doctrine of separation of powers are often couched as debates
between formalists (emphasizing a "unitary executive" model of the
Presidency) and functionalists (emphasizing the ultimate balance of power,
rather than its strict separation).232 Yet with respect to the PCAOB, even
functionalists have good reason to conclude that the structural design of the
PCAOB is a bridge too far.
CONCLUSION
Although Congress did not intend to do so, when it created the PCAOB
as an accounting industry regulator with an SEC-appointed board, Congress
created a federal entity that is "part of the Government" '233 for purposes of the
Constitution, including the commands of the Appointments Clause and
principles of separation of powers. The PCAOB's doubly insulated design is
constitutionally flawed because it allows the PCAOB to escape such checks
and balances.
If the Supreme Court declares the PCAOB unconstitutional, Congress
should act quickly to redesign the PCAOB, either as a true component of the
SEC, or as an independent regulatory agency with members who are appointed
by the President with advice and consent of the Senate, and removable for
cause by the President. Either alternative will result in an entity that is
substantially less "strange." But that new PCAOB will be one that is far more
in keeping with the democratic values embodied in the text and structure of
the Constitution.
232. See generally Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 488 (1987).
233. Lebron, 513 U.S. at 400.
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